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
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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH BASED ESSAY

US FOREIGN POLICY TO ZAIRE - SHOULD IT CHANGE?

BY

COLONEL GORDON C. COLEMAN
MEDICAL SERVICE



19 APRIL 1982

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INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

United States Foreign Policy to Zaire - should it change?

The author focuses on the adequacy of decision with national interest and foreign policy with emphasis on United States continuance of support of President Mobutu Sese-Seko's Regime.

To address this question, two related questions must be considered:

- (1) How does our current foreign policy serve U.S. national interest?;
- (2) In order to continue exerting proper influence in Zaire, is it most expedient and necessary to support Mobutu and use his government as a vehicle of our policy?

This paper will present a strategic assessment and economic analysis of Zaire. An examination of the nation building process along with an evaluation of the leadership of President Mobutu will be set forth. Finally, a review of past and present US foreign policy toward Zaire will lead to with some conclusions and recommendations for future action.

The purpose of this paper is to examine our foreign policy toward Zaire with the acknowledged premise that national security must be a primary consideration of our foreign policy.

BACKGROUND

The turbulence of today's international events challenges the United States to define, clarify, and coordinate its foreign policy, military aims and national interest on the African continent. Our African policy must be duly and clearly articulated, and U.S. security interests in the continent must be established. Our foreign policy must consistently recognize national security. National security must be the first consideration when offering foreign aid to other nations. Yet short-term foreign policy may hamper long-term national interest. It has been recognized that foreign policy and national defense are often at odds with each other.¹

The countries of the Subsahara region of Africa have many diversified political systems. These systems include a constitutional democracy, a monarchy, a military dictatorship, and a Marxist People's Republic. The political instability of the region could allow a relatively stable government in Zaire to be a major influence in the area. With its size, rich resources, central location among many neighboring countries, Zaire could be the key to the Subsahara region. The major world powers—People's Republic of China, United States and USSR—have each exerted influence in the region. Other foreign powers, including the Arab World, Cuba and Western Europe, are also exerting considerable influence in the area. These external powers are reacting to the East-West competition and the North-South dialogue. The instability of the

region and its growing importance in the world arena will increase the competition among the major power brokers of the world for dominance in the Sub Sahara region. In view of this complex power struggle, this paper will attempt to analyze the effect of the U.S. foreign policy to Zaire and to evaluate continued U.S. support of President Mobutu Sese-Seko's regime. An analysis of economics, relevant governments and security forces will be advanced to determine the U.S. security interest in Zaire. Since our national policy and defense must be conducted openly, they are open to public debate and dependent upon popular support. So policy issues will be examined with the aim of deciding whether to continue support to Zaire.

Is the U.S. foreign policy based primarily on humanitarian reasons, national security, or the deterrence of war? One might consider that foreign aid is solely used to benefit our present current national interest. Thus our priorities for setting foreign policy often appear to change. Nonetheless, this paper assumes that foreign policy should be based on national interest and security. The interests of both the United States and Zaire, their respective foreign policies, economies and military forces should be primary considerations in determination of foreign policy.

Strategic Assessment

The strategic significance of Zaire becomes apparent upon considering the economic and political interest the United States has in the country. The African continent is the world's second largest landmass. It is more than three times the size of the United States. Africa occupies roughly 20 percent of the earth's land surface, but supports only about 10 percent of the world's population.² The Republic of Zaire

is about the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River, with a land area of 905,063 square miles.³ Zaire is the third largest country in Africa and is located in the south-central part of the continent—the Subsahara Region.⁴ During World War II, the Subsahara Region was recognized as a strategic location for vital air routes. Further, the regions' mineral wealth was recognized then. At that time, the Belgian Congo contributed uranium to the allied war effort. Zaire was formerly called the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is bounded by nine different countries, with its longest border shared by Angola. Four deep water harbors on the north bank of the Congo River provide ocean shipping terminals to the Atlantic Ocean. A combination of tropical rain forest, high mountain terraces, dense grasslands and plateau savannas provide a variety of climates in the country. The Subsahara region has large reserves of minerals, thus producing most of the strategic mineral resources for the Free World. Dependence on African minerals has become more acute and widespread; so the loss of access to these materials could be devastating to industries of the West. Of the 16 minerals produced in the region, five are produced in Zaire:

African Minerals Production 1977⁵
(As a percentage of world production outside the
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China)

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Uses</u>	<u>African Suppliers</u>
Cobalt	66	Metallurgy, magnets	Zaire, Zambia, Morocco
Copper	22	Construction, electricity	Zaire, Zambia, South Africa
Diamonds	88	Abrasives, drilling bits	Zaire, South Africa, Botswana, Ghana
Germanium	52	Electronics, instruments	Zaire, Namibia
Tantalum	27	Electronics, super-alloys	Mozambique, Nigeria, Zaire

The economic growth and political development of Zaire is tied to its production of mineral resources. It produces two-thirds of the entire Free World supply of cobalt, and half of its industrial diamonds.⁶ The country has a variety of natural mineral resources which have been mined extensively during the 1970's.

Besides vast mineral resources, Zaire has tremendous resources in energy. The Zaire River has the potential to generate enough electrical power for most of central Africa. The hydroelectric facility at the Inga Dam now provides less than ten percent of the power generating capacity of the River.⁷ The national resource production and per capita gross (GNP) figures for Zaire indicate a significant growth potential:

Resource Production and per Capita Gross National Product ⁸

	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1985	1990
Copper (thousand tons)	385	428	491	530	740*	815*	950	1,185
Cobalt (thousand tons)	13.9	13	16.4	17	20.5*	25	31	39
Zinc (thousand tons)	—	72	72	72	72	72	72	72
Tin and cassiterite (tons)	—	5,892	5,500	5,200	4,900	4,600	4,000	—
Manganese ore (thousand tons)	347.1	369.5	330	330	330	330	330	—
Gold (kilograms)	—	4,300	4,000	3,600	3,000	3,000	2,200	—
Diamonds (millions of carats)	14.1	13.4	—	15	15	15	16.6	—
Oil (billions of barrels)	—	—	—	9	—	—	—	—
Per capita gross national product	—	100	85	87	100	103	117	126

*Actual projections are now lower as investment has slowed because of political and economic instability.

Having noted the geographic and economic significance of Zaire, one then must consider, "What is the U.S. interest in Central Africa"? An official view was set forth in testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 24, 1981, by Mr. Lannon Walker, Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs:

Recognizing that U.S. interests in Africa are served by progress in economic development, the Reagan Administration intends to maximize the effectiveness of resources through a more coordinated approach to planning, budgeting, and implementation of programs and projects. And our bilateral assistance will increasingly emphasize areas of strategic and political priority to the United States. . .

Southern/Central Africa, from Zaire south, is a region of considerable economic and political interest to the United States, one with extensive mineral wealth, and a heavy concentration of U.S. investment. U.S. interests are threatened by regional conflicts and instability which invite Soviet and Cuban intervention. . .

Liberia, Zaire, Senegal, Cameroon, and Gabon are old friends . . .

A fuller and more complete reflection of the manner in which the Reagan Administration will seek to utilize resources in pursuit of our foreign policy goals in Africa and elsewhere will be evident in the FY 1983 budget.

Access to strategic mineral resources is an important concern of the United States. Governmental instability in Zaire would make it physically difficult or impossible to extract or transport these resources, as was the case in the late 1970's. A hostile government could deliberately curtail the supply of minerals for its own political reasons. Thus the presence of Cubans in Angola raises considerable concern. Political stability in Zaire enables the United States to further its interest in the entire region. Zaire's economic potential and political influence could be a force in African affairs, offering possibilities for worthwhile relationships with neighboring nations.

Nation Building

Historically the relationship between the United States and the Subsahara Region has been minimal. Prior to World War II, U.S. policies toward Zaire consisted mainly of demands for freedom of access to markets and raw material and declarations of humanitarian ideals. When Zaire gained independence on June 30, 1960, the United States began to develop a foreign policy for the entire Subsahara Region. The Angolan Civil War of the mid 1970's, including Soviet and Cuban intervention, has caused the United States to be more concerned about the peaceful political development of the Subsahara Region. Since Zaire's independence, the new nation has been a target for Communist subversion. The secession in the mineral rich Katanga province was an attempt to split the country. The Katanga secession and a serious army revolt were put down by a four-year occupation of much of the country by a United Nations peacekeeping force of 15,000-20,000 troops.⁸ The United Nation's presence ended the post-independence crisis; nonetheless, the U.N. mission introduced the East-West power politics to Zaire.

After the U.N. forces were withdrawn in 1964, tribal warfare erupted in northeast Zaire. The revolt was known as the "Simba Rebellion". Russian and Chinese arms were delivered to the northern tribes via Sudan. The insurgent cadre was trained by radical African states, Communist countries, and Cuba. Likewise, these countries actively participated in the rebel leadership. After the rebellion was suppressed, the central government began to split as a result of domestic political infighting. The Congolese National Army commanded by Lieutenant General Joseph Desire Mobutu assumed control of the government. In November 1965 General Mobutu was appointed President of the Congo. Under President Mobutu's leadership the country has suffered two Katangan seces-

sionists attacks . . . one in 1977, and the other in 1978. The attacks were initiated by Cuban-trained Katangan rebels armed with Soviet equipment from neighboring Angola.⁹ The leaders of the 1977 attack were meeting in the Soviet Embassy at the time of the invasion.

In view of this overt competition for influence in Zaire, one can see that the country is clearly the key to the central region of Africa. It may possibly be the cornerstone to the Subsahara Region. Its location, climate, resources, borders and natural boundaries place it in a strategic position of influence, making it the source of ultimate control of about 50 percent of the continent. The control of the central region will help in the resolution of the Angolian problem, which influences the Namibia problem and thus raises the thorny South African issue.

Even though the foregoing analysis concedes Mobutu's capability of creating political solidarity in Zaire, one must not ignore the problem areas that are exacerbated by the more than 200 ethnic and cultural groups in the country. Numerous languages and dialects are spoken with the emergents of four semi official languages. The many languages and ethnic groups tend to make national unity an elusive goal. Further, Zaire has a weak transportation and agricultural system. The political and economic stability of the early 1970's have eroded as a result of insufficient domestic food production and rising inflation.

Mobutu's Leadership

Joseph Mobutu's introduction into Congolese politics came in September 14, 1960 when President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Par-tice Lumumba found themselves at an impasse over the control of the government. With the central government paralyzed, the Commander of the

Congolese National Army (ANC), Col. Joseph Mobutu, seized control of the government. Mobutu acted quickly and effectively to neutralize all rival politicians and assumed power for about three months. During this period the government was run by Congolese university students and graduates.

Prior to the peaceful coup, Mobutu had been a sergeant-major in the Force Publique, the Colonial Congolese Army.¹³ During that period, the highest rank attained by a Congolese was sergeant-major. The Belgians had not prepared Zaire for a gradual transition to independent statehood. Thus, in July 1960 there was a mutiny of the Force Publique, a few short weeks after independence. In an effort to Africanize the army, the Congolese soldiers democratically elected their own leaders from the ranks of the non-commissioned officers. As a result of this process Joseph Mobutu was named Colonel, Chief of Staff of the ANC. The colonial designation Force Publique was changed to ANC. The Force Publique in colonial times had been a defense and gendarmerie force. Its distinctive feature was its policy of ethnic mixing and integration.¹⁴ It had a reputation of toughness, efficiency and some brutality.¹⁵ Just before the 1960 military coup, Col. Mobutu was appointed commander of ANC by President Kasavubu. Mobutu's first political action after the coup was to expel the Soviet and Communist Bloc diplomats and technicians from Zaire. After three months at the helm Mobutu returned the government to President Kasavubu. As Chief of Staff and later Army Commander, Mobutu tried to create efficient units and a group of disciplined soldiers who were loyal to him. Mobutu accepted help from the U.N. forces and from the small cadre of Belgian regulars. He reabsorbed units from the various political factions and continued to receive assistance from Belgium and the United States.

The last and most important intervention into Zaire politically by Mobutu was done on November 24, 1965, when Mobutu led another coup against the central government. As in the 1960 coup, the military stepped in to break a stalemate within the government. The army seized control of the government, and Parliament installed LT. General Mobutu as President of the country. Mobutu declared a five year state of emergency and instituted a new regime to Zaire politics. Since the coup, the country's constitution was changed and Mobutu was elected. He was reelected to the 7 year term of office in a Presidential referendum held on December 2, 1977.¹⁶ The President of Zaire is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, empowered to declare war and make treaties without consent from the government. In an effort to create national identity, Mobutu asked the people to reject foreign models and to use their own heritage to shape the nation. Old names were changed to African names and the country's official name became Zaire on October 27, 1971.¹⁷ Joseph Desire Mobutu changed his name to Mobutu Sese-Seko. Under Mobutu's leadership Zaire experienced some gains and losses.

The Mobutu regime was created as a result of the crisis caused by the breakdown of the colonial system and the need for the international capitalist system to keep Zaire in its camp. A strong centralized government has surfaced with Mobutu in the seat of power. Internal and external opposition has grown against the Mobutu Regime. Zairian students have become uneasy with the government.¹⁸ The church and state have split, and the church has joined in opposition to the corrupt regime of Mobutu.¹⁹ A number of splint political groups of exiles have operated against Mobutu from European countries. Despite this dissent, it is clear that Mobutu has united the nation during times of govern-

mental crisis; however, popular support of Mobutu is declining and the opposition that is present may eventually destroy the Mobutu Regime.

In foreign relations Zaire has assumed a significant role in African politics. It is active in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and has hosted the OAU Chiefs of State Conference. Mobutu lead the black African support from Israel to the Arabs in 1973.²⁰

During the Shaba invasion, Zaire received material and diplomatic aid from some Arab nations. Egypt has extended full support to Mobutu. In February 1980, they signed a military pact with Zaire insuring military cooperation between the two countries. Zaire helped to create the economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes with Burundi and Rwanda. President Mobutu has occasioned tripartite meetings with Tanzania and Zambia to work on mutual problems. An important milestone for Zaire and the region was the 1979 Mutual Non-Aggression Pact signed by the Presidents of Angola, Zaire and Zambia. This pact will increase trade and cooperation between the countries; it is of political and psychological value to the region. The two rebel invasions have prompted Mobutu to reevaluate his army's needs and seek support to train and equip his forces. In January 1980, Belgium, China and France agreed to train and equip a number of military units.

In the international scene Zaire has relations with some Communist countries. In fact, the relationship between Cuba and East Germany was strained over the role of these countries played in the Shaba invasion into Zaire. In October 1979, Zaire reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba at the ambassadorial level. Zaire tries to pursue a non-alignment policy between East and West and seek to promote a North-South relationship with developing countries.²¹

Despite Zaires' active role in international affairs, the economy of Zaire is weak and its outlook is dismal. Although the economy was stable prior to independence, it suffered some setbacks in the immediate years following 1960. The governmental leadership has been weak in finance and has paid little attention to economics. The country's economic reforms, aided by advice from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were damaged by the decline in world copper prices in 1975. The drop in copper sharply reduced Zaire revenues. Likewise, the economy has suffered setbacks from inflation, over borrowing and budget deficits.

Prior to the decline in copper prices, Mobutu started a program to place the economy in national hands. Foreign owned agriculture, transportation and commercial business were transferred to Zairian ownership. This disruption caused many management problems. The resulting corruption and incompetence, along with declining copper prices, pushed the economy to the edge of bankruptcy. To save the country from financial disaster, Mobutu reversed the nationalization program and returned 60 percent of the shares back to the original owners. Zaire's creditors agreed to syndicate a loan to pay for imported capital goods to help the economy recover. Mobutu instituted a major three- year development plan to reorganize the agricultural, energy, mining and transportation sectors of Zaire's economy. The "Mobutu Plan" was to be implemented from 1978 to 1980. The major objectives of the plan were the orderly management of public property, economic and financial stabilization of the country, and a new impetus to production. The plan had two phases - the emergency program and the investment program.²² The emergency program provided such short-term essential products as food, fuel, medicine and

spare parts. The long-term aim of the investment program was to ensure self-sufficiency in food production and the exportation of agricultural products. In mining, the investment program was to expand and rehabilitate existing mines. The investment program would also upgrade the railroad, improve the transportation system and extend the water and electricity network.²³ The supply of petroleum products would also be ensured.

An IMF stabilization package was put together to tighten loose financial government policies, to reduce the balance of payment deficits and to provide a coherent fiscal policy for the future. Even so, Zaire faces a four billion dollar foreign debt and rising inflation. In 1981, the Western creditors proposed a ten year rescheduling plan of the medium and long-term debt totalling \$4.36 billion.²⁴ The proposal was based on the premise that Zaire could not survive economically without help. Further, if the Mobutu Regime fell, it was expected that the resulting chaos and likely emergence of a semi-Communist government would be unacceptable.²⁵ The Western countries recognize that Zaire produces 60 percent of the world's cobalt, 50 percent of the free world's industrial diamonds, as well as large quantities of copper, zinc, tin, columbium-tantalum, manganese and several rare metals.²⁶ Offshore oil was discovered in 1970, and production by a Western consortium began in 1975. These resources alone provide pragmatic justification for policies designed to strengthen and stabilize Mobutu's leadership.

At an Afro-American conference in Virginia in 1979, the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation from Zaire, Nguza Karl-i-Bond, discussed the role of private investments in the Afro-American economic interdependence. Nguza talked about the place of

private investment in the North-South economic relation and in the search for a new international economic order for African nations. He discussed the conditions to be fulfilled by private investors as this indicates:

These economic relations were characterized by unilateral dependence which began during the colonial era when the colonial powers considered the colonies mere reserves of raw materials and outlets for their industrial products.

Concerning the United States in particular, the speaker was of the opinion that private investment, which is a symbol of capitalist society, can become an instrument of economic interdependence provided it can take forms compatible with the African countries where the community system predominates.

Concerning the problem of political stability, Citizen Nguza stressed the positive role which the great powers can play in light of certain cases of destabilization experienced in Africa during the past few years.²⁷

Thus, the United States should establish good trade ties and seek economic partners in Africa. Further, the United States has none of the colonial baggage to carry. An existing program of assistance and communication is provided by the Food for Peace Program (P.L. 480), the Peace Corps, the Christian missionary schools, and the 25 million Americans of African heritage. The missionary schools have done much to train African leadership. By building on this solid base, United States-African relation will be stronger and our influence may expand throughout the African continent.

Past U.S. Policy

Since World War II, military planners have looked at Africa as an offshoot of U.S. national security interest in Western Europe, Middle East and Asia. Throughout this period the U.S. military political thinking process was dominated by these priorities:

1. Determination of Soviet intentions in Western Europe.

2. Support of the emerging state of Israel.
3. Seeking ways to replace the ties that the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium had with their former colonies.
4. Maintaining fair price trade with the emerging oil producing Middle Eastern states.
5. Providing the technology to keep oil flowing from those states.³⁴

Africa is conspicuous by its absence on this list of priorities. During this late Colonial period, Africa was unimportant to the United States as a source of raw materials and unprocessed food-stuff. A result of this casual attitude was a limited military aid program to Africa. The Military assistance Program monies to Zaire were meager:³⁵

FY 1973
\$227,000

FY 1974
\$350,000

FY 1975
\$300,000

Most of the funded programs were for military education and training; they did not include equipment transfers. The United States did not wish to sell arms to Zaire. The Kennedy administration expanded U.S. aid to Africa by helping Zaire during the early years of its independence. The expansion caused some second thoughts about the U.S. containment doctrine as it applied to Africa. The Kennedy administration wanted to separate its position from Secretary Dulles' policy toward "left leaning" governments.³⁶

The United States and Zaire have had excellent relations since Zaire's independence. Both countries share an interest in economic growth and a peaceful political development in central Africa. The United States interest has sought to assist Zaire to achieve economic and social progress, thus to build a strong nation in an unstable region. Total U.S. bilateral economic and military assistance to Zaire

through fiscal year 1977 was about \$650 million.²⁸

Zaire has maintained close liaison to the United States since its independence of June 1960. The United States recognized the new nation immediately and worked early on to assure the territorial integrity of Zaire. On 30 June 1960, President Eisenhower sent cordial greetings to the newly independent nation of the Republic of Congo.²⁹ The United States devoted \$230 million in economic aid to Zaire during its first three years of independence (1960-1963) to help preserve its territorial unity.³⁰ Accompanying the economic aid was the establishment of a very small U.S. military assistance and advisory group (MAAG). The U.S. military representation included a defense attache with intelligence as their primary mission.³¹

In an effort to balance the East-West ideology conflict in Angola, the United States began to funnel arms and money to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The supplies for FNLA were sent through Zaire.³² U.S. efforts were directed against the Soviet backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Zaire supported the FNLA movement and helped to recruit its army. President Mobutu allowed the FNLA constituency to operate and stage guerrilla raids from southern Zaire. Zaire paid a price for supporting the FNLA group. A group of Zairian exiles based in Angola invaded Zaire to overthrow President Mobutu. The invasion was crushed by Mobutu. With encouragement from the United States, peace was made with Angola in 1978.³³

The East-West struggle for Angola has intensified the South African problem, since Angola serves as a base for guerrilla operation into neighboring Namibia. Namibia was a League of Nation mandated country of South Africa and is still under its control. The key to Zaire's African

situation is Angola. The instability in Angola and the presence of Cubans is likely to last as long as the southern border is open to South Africa as long as the Namibia question is not solved. South Africa sends military forces from Namibia into neighboring Angola and Zambia to counter the Soviet-Cuban involvement there. The possible resolution of the Namibia problem rests primarily upon Angolan-Cuban non-intervention into Namibia. Zaire supports the FNLA of Angola and the United States has supported Zaire. Another dimension of the problem is the continued extensive trade between Zaire and South Africa.

The U.S. military assistance to Zaire was not restricted to money. The U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM) organized in 1973 a military airlift of grain to the drought stricken areas of Zaire. In June 1978, during the Shaba invasion from Angola, REDCOM moved the joint task force to Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina and was prepared to deploy to Zaire and function as an overall U.S. military headquarters in the event that U.S. forces other than the airlift would be involved. Three battalions of the 82d Airborne Division from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were to have been committed.³⁷ During the 1978 crisis the U.S. Military Airlift Command performed a difficult mission of delivery of cargo and troops to the Shaba province to repeal the invasion. The operation was logistical in nature and did not involve any U.S. personnel for combat functions. Even so, the United States interest in Zaire was of limited magnitude and the foreign policy was not clearly defined. The U.S. aid program to Africa accounted for about one-tenth of the total aid to Africa. The military assistance grant program for all of Africa amounted to about two percent of the total global U.S. program.

Present U.S. Policy

Current U.S. policy toward Zaire was set forth by Deputy Assistant Secretary Lannon Walker at a hearing to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, on FY81 Military and Development Aid to Zaire, March 5, 1980:

First, let there be no mistake that our interests in Zaire are long-term in nature . . . With its population of 27 million, (Zaire) is the third largest sub-Saharan African state. In terms of land area it ranks second in size and it borders on nine other states in central and southern Africa. It is a fact that Zaire's sheer size and economic potential make it critical to regional stability. And it is a fact that Zaire's moderate foreign policy orientation and close relations with the West stand in marked contrast to several countries in the area (that) favor more radical policies and have turned to the USSR, East Germany, and Cuba for military and economic support.

Zaire is also the world's leading producer of both cobalt and industrial diamonds, and the seventh largest producer of copper. It has consistently supplied Western markets over the past two decades and intends to continue this policy in the future. The United States imports over 60 percent of its cobalt from Zaire. The mining sector in Zaire, in turn, is an important market for US equipment and technology. US interest in the hotel industry, tire and battery manufacturing, flour milling, and vehicle assembly plant and other US investments are all commercially important in this, Black Africa's third largest market.

Furthermore, Zaire's political support continues to be important to our interests in Africa and elsewhere. Zaire is pro-Western in its foreign policy and in the positions it takes in international operations. It has been a consistent voice of reason in the councils of the Organization of African Unity, the non-aligned movement, and the United Nations. Zaire has strongly encouraged efforts to find peaceful solutions to regional disputes, including support for the Camp David accords. It has opposed efforts by radicals such as Cuba and Vietnam to dominate the non-aligned movement, instead aligning itself with other moderates such as Yugoslavia, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Singapore . . . Zaire condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and supported the United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for immediate Soviet withdrawal . . . In regional affairs, Zaire-though not one of the Front Line States-has consistently and actively supported combined Western and African efforts to find peaceful solutions in Namibia.³⁸

This 1980 policy statement clearly seeks to establish a long-term con-

text for United States-Zaire relations. For the United States, Zaire represents:

1. A source of essential natural resources.
2. A significant strategic location.
3. A focal point for influence in the Subsahara region.
4. A problem area in human rights.
5. A site for power projection/confrontation.

Political stability in Zaire is directly related to progress in its economic development. In a region where agricultural production is down, droughts are prevalent, refugee problems occur, inadequate health facilities exist, and an infrastructure is missing, vital economic development is essential.

When President Mobutu visited the United States in September 1979, he met with President Carter for discussions about Zaire and the Mobutu Plan for development. The results of the meeting can be summed in the following statement by President Carter to Mobutu:

Mr. President, we have helped you to overcome all difficulties and to improve and develop your country's economy in the most harmonious way. I would like on behalf of the United States and my administration to assure you that we shall continue the task we have started. We have the duty to encourage you in the efforts that you have undertaken and we consider all to be satisfactory as far as the administration and the American opinion are concerned.³⁹

President Carter's statement provides the substance of the U.S. policy to Zaire. This foreign policy for Zaire was elaborated by Mr. Walker of the Department of State and the general policy for foreign aid is stated in legislation by Congress:

Therefore, the Congress declares that a principal objective of the foreign policy of the United States is the encouragement and sustained support of the people of developing countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential to development and to build the economic, political, and

social institutions which will improve the quality of their lives.

United States development cooperation policy should emphasize four principal goals:

(1) the alleviation of the worst physical manifestation of poverty among the world's poor majority;

(2) the promotion of conditions enabling developing countries to achieve self-sustaining economic growth with equitable distribution of benefits;

(3) the encouragement of development process in which individual civil and economic rights are respected and enhanced; and

(4) the integration of the developing countries into an open and equitable international economic system.⁴⁰

The Carter Administration urged President Mobutu to curb human rights abuses and change the political structure of the country to improve the prospect for a peaceful transition of power at such time as the government leadership passes.

The Reagan Administration has set forth additional guiding principles for foreign policy. These principles give a sense of purpose to foreign policy and send a clear signal to all concerned. The principles include consistency in pursuit of U.S. interests, reliability upon U.S. support as a force for peace and stability, and balance in our approach to individual issues, and the orchestration of policy.⁴¹ In accord with these principles, the foreign policy objectives for Africa were stated by Mr. Chester Crocker on August 29, 1981:

Let me enumerate what this Administration has set forth as its objectives in Africa.

- o America seeks to promote peace and regional security in Africa and to deny opportunities to all those who seek contrary objectives.
- o We will support proven friends and be known as a reliable partner in Africa as elsewhere.

- o We support open market opportunities, access to key resources, and expanding African and American economies.
- o The United States actively supports regional security and peaceful solutions to the problems of southern Africa.
- o We seek to expand and assist that group of nations whose development policies produce economic progress and which have working democratic institutions.
- o The United States will do its share in meeting Africa's humanitarian needs and in supporting basic human liberties, in keeping with both American principles and American interests.⁴²

These objectives clearly indicate that the United States is concerned with Soviet and Soviet Bloc influence in Africa. If the various regions have no political order, the mutual regional interests — economic, commercial and humanitarian — will not be met. Without political order, the region will not be able to engage in nation-building. Further, the United States will be unable to influence the strategic environment that affects Africa. In keeping with its foreign policy principles and African objectives, the Reagan Administration proposes that Zaire receive \$10.5 million in foreign military sales credit for FY 82 and FY 83 and \$1.56 million in international military and educational training credit for FY 82.⁴⁰ Likewise, there are indications that the United States would consider military intervention into Zaire if Mobutu's forces are unable to control another rebel led Shaba invasion. Another consideration for intervention would be simultaneous attacks on the capital and various provinces.⁴⁴ The reality of the situation is that the United States must consider support to those young governments that are easily shaken in order to secure the consistent support of the United States on such international issues as Iran and Afghanistan.

CONCLUSIONS

The U.S. strategic and political interests are best served when we apply our foreign aid to those developing countries whose goals of economic development and whose political and social institution are closely allied to our own. These emerging situations challenge the United States and represent areas of concern for our government: collective political power, human rights concerns, mineral resources and strategic locations. These challenges may be met through support from such multilateral institutions for developing countries as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Zaire is the key to the central region; its dominance and influence spreads throughout the region. Zaire is important to the United States because of its size, its central location, its mineral resources and its economic resources.

If the United States is to live up to the stated objectives of congressional legislation, then there can be no question concerning the continued aid to Zaire. That country meets the criteria stated in the objectives. When consideration is given to Subsahara Africa it appears that there is no alternative but to support Mobutu. Friendly relations with Zaire are helpful to the United States on the international scene and with other African countries. Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha of South Africa has talked about a constellation of states with Zaire as the northern anchor.⁴⁵ At present this constellation concept is unworkable due to the political and racial differences between White South Africa and Black African nations. Yet the idea does have appeal in the context of a regional government. The resolution of the Angolan and Namibian problems may well be effected through the influence of Zaire. The access to strategic minerals, airspace overflight rights and

routine port visitations are of prime importance to the United States if we are to project our influence into the region.

To further explore the question of continued foreign aid to Zaire, we must carefully scrutinize the Mobutu Regime. Even though there is evidence of corruption, mismanagement, and human rights abuses in the government, can the United States allow an unfriendly government to dominate the central region of Africa? The United States cannot afford to be self-righteous with other governments. Our own record of governmental inefficiency and neglect of human rights can hardly be considered to be exemplary. From most of the evidence studied it seems that Mobutu's position is relatively stable. In a real sense, Mobutu was protected by the United States early in the development of Zaire. He has proved to be pro-Western in foreign policy, a voice of moderation in the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned movement in the United Nations. Mobutu is an advocate of a North-South dialogue and fosters the new economic order for the African states. In the short-term, it appears that Mobutu can stay in power. He has weathered many crises and seems able to control the government. If proper long-term policy is taken, it is likely that economic improvement will consolidate Mobutu's power for a longer period. It would be prudent for the United States to actively support Zaire. In either case a weakened Mobutu Regime would create a power vacuum in Zaire. Zaire in turmoil would destabilize the entire region. Any successor would face the financial constraints placed upon them from the past performance of the Mobutu Regime of mismanagement and spending.

Zaire seems to be on the long road to financial stability. In June 1981, the IMF extended a three year credit of \$1.2 billion when Zaire showed a one percent GDP growth after five years of negative growth.⁴⁶

Among the Third World nations the country has a relatively high foreign exchange earning and tremendous economic potential. The amount of arable land for agricultural production is more than enough to feed its population. Some critics doubt that the Mobutu Plan and reforms will save the nation. Yet no one doubts the country's tremendous potential, Mobutu's determination to keep the peace, or the country's territorial integrity. The country has struggled for independence, was torn by internal conflict and has suffered some tough times. Continued U.S. aid will provide positive constructive contribution for Zaire's future development. A prudent foreign policy would be to show aggressive diplomacy and generous aid, with a clear perception of Zaire's political situation. Encourage an atmosphere in which the United States will be able to foster conflict resolution throughout the Subsahara region and capitalize on our mutual economic interests.

Our foreign policy should support our national interest by keeping Zaire in the pro U.S. camp. Political stability and economic improvement in Zaire are very much in the U.S. interest. Policies should not be concerned with immediate or short range goals. They should be clear cut, long-term programs that are compatible with the United States and Zairian interest. To pursue these goals, the following recommendations for implementation of our foreign policy are offered:

1. Continue visible support for the IMF stabilization program in Zaire; tighten the fiscal policies of IMF and the World Bank.
2. Provide balanced assistance in economic, political and military matters. Show the flag.
3. Sponsor investment, business interest and trade in Zaire.
4. Place the Subsahara region under the U.S. Readiness

Command for military assistance matters and contingency planning.

5. Provide logistical support where appropriate for the peacekeeping efforts of the region.

6. Encourage Black Americans to accept military assignments in MAAG units in Black African countries.

7. Improve the U.S. image among moderate African nations by supporting Zaire.

8. Encourage, with U.S. technology, the upgrading of agriculture and transportation systems in the region.

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